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Introduction
The current economic slowdown calls for a careful investigation of how to make tax-bene…t systems more cost e¤ective and how to minimize welfare losses and limit the extension of deep poverty at a time of cuts in public spending. For this purpose, lessons from the very recent period, and, notably, the role of policy developments occurring during 2008-2010, the …rst "dip" in the Great Recession, can be learned. As yet, little is known about the capacity of existing redistribution systems to soften the negative impacts of job and earnings losses, 1 as well as the e¤ectiveness of the policy initiatives that quickly followed the onset of the economic slump. This is not only due to the fact that microdata come with an inevitable delay but also because the di¤erent factors a¤ecting the distribution of disposable income are intertwined. 2 In particular, it is important to attempt to disentangle the e¤ect of changes in market income inequality (due to wage cuts, job losses or working time reduction in the private sector, changes to the minimum wage etc.) and the e¤ect of tax-bene…t reforms. The latter may indeed have cushioned or exacerbated the e¤ects of the crisis on the income distribution through income tax and social insurance reforms, changes in the generosity of family bene…ts or welfare programs, etc. Comparing European experiences in this context also seems highly relevant. The e¤ects of each of these factors may have been di¤erent across countries depending on how deeply they were a¤ected by the crisis and on the speci…c nature of the policy responses.
In this paper, we provide some answers to these questions by studying the contribution of tax-bene…t policies to changes in inequality and poverty in Europe between 2008 and 2010. We use tax-bene…t microsimulation to construct counterfactual situations that show what the post-tax and transfer income distribution would have looked like in 2010 if either tax-bene…t policies or the distribution of pre-tax and transfer incomes had remained unchanged between the two years. In this way, we are able to disentangle the pure e¤ect of tax-bene…t policy changes occurring over the period from changes in the environment 1 An exception is the study of Jenkins et al. (2013) on the short-term impact of the Great Recession in twenty-one OECD countries. The authors …nd that the household sector was largely protected from the downturn through the tax and bene…t system. Among the six countries that the authors study in detail, the softest landings were found to be experienced by the countries with the strongest welfare states, Germany and Sweden. For most of the countries studied, there was little change in the household income distribution between 2007 and 2009. They note, however, that in the medium-to longer-term, there is likely to be much greater change as a result of …scal consolidation. 2 For instance, an approach that consists of measuring the contribution of taxes and transfers to overall inequality/poverty at di¤erent points in time, e.g. before and after the …rst "dip" of the Great Recession, does not allow us to extract the pure e¤ect of policy changes from their interaction with the underlying population. That is, this method cannot tell whether social assistance schemes, for example, may appear more redistributive because of their increased generosity or because of automatic increases in welfare spending as unemployment rises.
in which these policies operate, particularly changes in market income inequality which may have occurred due to job losses or wage cuts. 3 This analysis is carried out for four European countries which were a¤ected di¤erently by the economic crisis, namely France, Germany, Ireland and the UK. For each country, we isolate and quantify the e¤ect of tax-bene…t policy changes over 2008-2010 on a range of poverty and inequality measures. We use representative microdata for each country (EU-SILC data) from the beginning of the economic crisis (2007/2008) and from the latest period available (2009/2010), coupled with microsimulation models (SWITCH for Ireland and EUROMOD for France, Germany and the UK), i.e. models that transform gross income into disposable income for each household, taking into account all taxes, transfers and contributions in each period and country. Using these simulations, we can draw conclusions about the e¤ect of the economic crisis on poverty and inequality across countries as well as the e¤ectiveness of tax-bene…t policies in each country in responding to the economic crisis.
We …nd that, while the policy response wasvery similar in the UK and France, it has contributed to stabilize relative poverty only in the UK. Market income changes have pushed up inequality, child poverty and, especially, overall poverty depth more strongly in France so that policy responses have only partly corrected this trend, resulting in an increase in the intensity of poverty and in child poverty. Ireland, in the early part of the crisis, implemented an even more progressive policy response than the UK and France, due mainly to sharp increases in income-related taxation with more limited reductions in welfare payments. This policy e¤ect is responsible for an overall reduction in relative poverty and inequality in this country. The UK, France and Ireland have managed to reduce absolute child poverty (i.e. poverty calculated with the poverty line anchored in real terms at its initial level). In contrast, policy responses have been fairly regressive in Germany, with tax cuts and very slow uprating of social transfers resulting in an increase in relative poverty, poverty depth and elderly poverty. Other e¤ects, which include changes in market incomes and non-simulated policies like changes in unemployment insurance in France, have played a relatively modest role despite rising unemployment in Ireland (and to a lesser extent in France and the UK) and work sharing in Germany. Among exceptions are the large contributions of these other e¤ects to the increased poverty rate and depth in France and to child poverty in Germany. Overall, tax-bene…t policy responses have played an important role, sometimes explaining most of the time changes in poverty. Further research should make use of more recent years of data and uprated tax-bene…t microsimulations in order to identify the impact of policy factors and shifts in market income over the prolonged crisis. The paper is laid out in the following manner. Section 2 examines the macroeconomic situation faced by the four countries under examination as well detailing the policy changes implemented over the time period analysed. Section 3 documents the methodology and data used. Section 4 presents the results of our analysis while section 5 concludes.
Macroeconomic and Policy Background 2.1 Welfare Regimes before the Crisis and the Macroeconomic Context
Our study presents an original perspective by comparing trends in income distributions and policy developments in four European countries which have been impacted di¤erently by the crisis. In the year preceding it, all four countries were relatively close in terms of GDP per capita. 4 France and Germany used to be classi…ed under the conservative/corporatist welfare regime (Esping-Andersen 1990) while the UK represented a more liberal model, although some nuance is required. Despite low income tax rates, the UK o¤ered a safety net in the form of income support schemes and a relatively generous family tax credit for working poor families. In parallel, France and Germany have experienced a signi…cant cut in tax levels since the early 2000s while introducing or increasing transfers to the working poor. In Germany, wage moderation and reforms of the social system in the early 2000s may also have had some regressive impact on the distribution of income but there is no substantial evidence of this. Ireland was traditionally placed at a somewhat intermediary position, with a social protection system described sometimes as "catholic corporatist" (McLaughlin, 1993) , due to the role of the Church and the central role of the family, or as competitive corporatist since transfers, taxation and labor market institutions were broadly adapted to competitiveness objectives (Hardiman 2000).
The evolution observed during the …rst dip of the crisis is particularly contrasted, ranging from the German employment "miracle" (still accompanied by wage moderation) to a strong negative adjustment in the Irish economy, with the UK and France performing somewhere in between. Given these di¤erent experiences, we may expect very di¤erent trends in market incomes between 2008 and 2010 across these countries. We describe the macroeconomic context in detail below. The importance of automatic stabilizers and discretionary …scal policy in each country will also, ultimately, determine the extent to which the Great Recession a¤ected overall poverty and inequality measures during this timespan. Policy options in each country are described in the next sub-section.
Germany and France. Germany experienced a strong macro shock in 2008-09 ( 4:9% in real GDP) but a return to positive growth of over 4% in 2010 as shown in Figure 1 , largely due to strong global demand for German exports (Jenkins et al, 2013) . The use of short-time work in particular has prevented an increase in unemployment and, according to Bargain et al. (2012) , has partly (fully) limited the increase in relative (absolute) poverty. Unemployment rates in Germany and France prior to 2008 were generally higher than those in Ireland and the UK, as shown in Figure 2 . German unemployment rates resumed falling after 2009, reaching their lowest level in recent decades (5:5% in 2012). 5 France was less internationally exposed than other countries like Germany due to a traditionally strong reliance on its internal market. The macro shock was therefore slightly smaller ( 3:7% of GDP in 2009) but so was the return to growth in 2010 (+1:1%). This was accompanied by a long-lasting deterioration of labor market conditions ( Figure 2) , showing an increase in unemployment from a low of 7:8% in 2008 to 9:7% in 2010.
Ireland and the UK. The period 2008 to 2010 saw a recession of unprecedented severity in the Irish economy. GDP had grown strongly over the preceding 15 years, with employment almost doubling and unemployment rates falling sharply ( Figure 2 ). During this 'Celtic Tiger'period, unemployment fell to just over 4% in 2000 and remained around this level until 2008. Over the years 2008 to 2010, real national income fell by close to 10% -more than double the size of the fall in the UK, Germany and France. The economic deterioration was driven by a collapse in the property sector and an accompanying sharp fall in employment in the construction sector, upon which the Irish economy had become heavily reliant, a banking crisis and the worldwide …nancial crisis. 6 Unemployment more 5 Burda and Hunt (2011) attribute this 'unemployment miracle'to a variety of factors such as employers reticence to hire in the preceding expansion, wage moderation and an increased adoption of 'working time accounts'. Brenke et al. (2011) also give credit to the expansion of the short-term compensation scheme, which provides …nancial aid for …rms experiencing di¢ culties if they agree to reduce working hours and pay, describing it as the 'German answer'to the great recession. 6 The banking crisis resulted in the government guaranteeing both investors and bondholders and led to unsustainable yields on Irish bonds as government debt grew. These unsustainable yields led to the Irish government seeking a …nancial 'bailout' from the ECB and IMF in 2010. Firm commitments to …scal austerity formed part of the terms of the economic adjustment package, with further negative than doubled between 2008 and 2010, increasing from 6:4% in 2008 to 13:9% in 2010. The UK, fuelled by the global …nancial crisis, also entered its deepest recession since the Second World War in 2008. Signi…cant falls in real GDP were experienced between 2008 and 2010 with a decline of 1:6% in 2008 and 4:6% in 2009, followed by a return to positive growth in 2010 of 1%. A weak recovery was followed by the …rst double-dip recession in the UK since the 1970s as a return to negative growth occurred in 2012. Unemployment rose from 5:6% in 2008 to 7:8% in 2010. now, we describe the main policy changes characterizing the period studied, 2008-2010. 7 Tax-bene…t policy changes in all four countries are also summarized in Table A .2 in the Appendix.
France. A number of …scal and social policy reforms were enacted in France during the great recession. The most important structural changes to the welfare system concerns the minimum income. In 2009, the minimum guaranteed income bene…t (RMI) and the lone parent means-tested bene…t (API) were replaced with a single means-tested bene…t (RSA, Revenu de Solidarité Active) which incorporates an in-work bene…t component. That is, the RSA ensures a minimum income per month, with larger amounts for eligible lone parents, while providing permanent incentives to work due to the taper rate of 38% on earnings, replacing the 100% rate under API and RMI. While the RSA was in operation for only a few months in 2009, our simulation of the 2010 situation should account for the full year e¤ect of this reform compared to the 2008 system. The extension of social assistance to the working poor thanks to the lower withdrawal rate -and despite the low take-up of the "in-work" RSA (33%) -must contribute to decreasing poverty. There is also a progressive e¤ect of welfare payment uprating policies. Over the three years studied, family bene…ts and social assistance payments have been uprated at around 3%, which is slightly faster than mean wage growth (+1:9%) and mean income growth (our uprating factor, equal to 0:4% for France). However, the earned income tax credit on low-wage earners (PPE) was frozen in nominal terms. 8 On the side of income taxation and social contributions, a salient policy measure of the Sarkozy government, the tax rebate on paid overtime, should not impact on our results since it was put in place in August 2007 and withdrawn in 2012, outside the period studied. Slightly progressive tax reforms have taken place in 2009 (the withholding tax on capital was increased from 16 to 18%, and the lowest earners were given relief on two-thirds of their tax bill, an "income tax holiday") and 2010 (the marginal income tax rate for the highest earners increased from 40% to 41% while the RSA was …nanced with a further 1:1% tax on capital income). 9 Germany. The period is characterized by very modest adjustments to social bene…ts. The basic amount of social assistance (ALGII) was uprated by just 1% between 2008-2010 while payments for rent and heating were frozen. More structural changes in family bene…ts are also observed in Germany. While the universal child bene…t (Kindergeld) was higher for each child after the third in 2008, rates increased from the second child onwards in 2009. 10 That same year, education bene…ts were reformed. Students with children under 10 years of age are now entitled to a more generous top-up of e113 for the …rst child and e198 for any subsequent children. Means-tested child allowances have also been reformed. 11 Reforms on the tax side also seem of a regressive nature. Taxation of capital income (Kapitaleinkommensteuer) was modi…ed in 2009. Until then, capital income was treated like any other income, except for a separate tax free allowance. From 2009 onwards, capital income was taxed separately at a ‡at rate of 25%, except for a taxfree allowance, which was slightly increased (+6% in 2009). That same year, the lowest 8 Also, an exceptional bonus of e150 (Prime Exceptionnelle) for families eligible for the "Back to School" means-tested child bene…t and of e200 (Prime de solidarité active) for low income families were part of a speci…c anti-crisis package which was not renewed in 2010 (and therefore not relevant for our analysis). 9 Among other policy developments that may be captured in our "other e¤ects", let us emphasize reforms of the unemployment insurance system. While unemployment bene…t duration used to be related to the number of months that the individual had worked for in the previous three years, the 2009 reform switched unemployment insurance to a "one day worked, one day of compensation" system, provided the individual had worked at least 4 months in the last 28. 10 In addition, in 2009, there was an add-on to the general bene…t rate, of e100 per child, which was subsequently abolished in 2010 so that it should not a¤ect our decomposition exercise over 2008-2010. 11 A child allowance, of a maximum of e140 per month per entitled child, was paid if household income was deemed not to cover the needs of children younger than 25 who live in the same household. From 2009 on, parental leave bene…ts are included in the income test. The income threshold used to de…ne the childrens'needs is set at a …xed amount of e600 per lone parent and e900 per couple. The fraction of own income that is withdrawn from the bene…t amount decreases in 2009 from 70% to 50%.
income tax rate decreased from 15 to 14%. 12 Ireland. Over the 2008 to 2010 period, austerity measures were focused mainly on tax increases, with substantial increases in income-related taxes. These led to a strongly progressive impact over this period. Recall that the Irish government had become overreliant on transitory taxes (such as stamp duty on property transactions) and, during the boom, had narrowed the tax base, removing many workers from the tax net entirely. In 2009, an Income Levy was introduced, payable on gross income (excluding social welfare payments). The initial rate was 1% on annual income up to e100; 100 and 2% on income in excess of that. In a 'supplementary'budget of 2009, necessitated by the rapid deterioration in the public …nances, the income levy rates increased with an exemption for the …rst e15; 028 of annual income (with a higher exemption limit, e20; 000, for the over 65's), a rate of 2% charged on income from e75; 036 to e174; 980 and a rate of 6% charged in excess of that level. In addition, the cap on the annual income above which no further social insurance contributions (PRSI) were payable rose in 2009 while the Health Levy (a payment made to fund health services) was doubled (reaching 4%, and even 5% for incomes above e75; 036) in 2010. On the welfare side, the overall reduction in working age bene…ts for 2008-2010 was just under 1%. 13 Rates paid to old age pensioners remained at the increased level. Universal child bene…t was sharply reduced, falling by 10% between 2008 and 2010 with a full o¤setting of the impact on welfare recipients through an increase in a more targeted form of child income support. Non-contributory unemployment payments (Jobseekers Allowance) for those aged 18-21 were reduced to e100 per week (compared to e196 for older workers). Public servants experienced two reductions in pay via a 'Pension Related Deduction' (PRD), introduced in 2009, whereby the …rst e15; 000 of annual earnings were exempt, with 5% paid on the next e5; 000 of earnings, 10% paid on earnings between e20; 000 and e60; 000 and 10:5% on earnings above e60; 000. This a¤ected net pay. A further pay-cut for public sector workers, this time on gross pay, was implemented in 2010 with a reduction of 5% on the …rst e30; 000 of salary, 7:5% on the next e40; 000 and a 10% reduction on the next e55; 000. These changes to public sector wages are treated here as an extra 'tax' on the public sector and, hence, are modelled explicitly and will fall into our 'policy e¤ect'.
UK. Most social welfare payments increased annually in real terms over the years 2008-2010 using the retail price index (RPI) or by the Rossi price index in the case of meanstested bene…ts. Since the Rossi index excludes housing costs and local taxes, welfare payments have increased faster than overall prices and even faster than wages (Income Support has increased by 8:2% while the mean wage has increased by 1:7%). Universal child bene…ts have also increased rapidly (+8%). While the basic element of the Child Tax Credit was not uprated, the child increment was increased by 7:2%. Redistribution towards the working poor was also accentuated, with an uprating of 6:7% of the working tax credit. The basic rate limit of income taxation increased in 2009 to £ 37; 400 and remained constant in 2010 while a third rate of income tax was introduced that year (50% on incomes over £ 150; 000). The personal tax allowance was increased by £ 130 for the tax years 2009-10 and removed for incomes above £ 100; 000 in April 2010. With regards to social insurance rates and bands, the upper earnings limit increased in April 2009 to align it with the threshold of the top income tax rate. The standard rate reduced from 17:5% to 15% in December 2009.
Methodology
We use tax-bene…t microsimulators linked to household surveys to simulate disposable income distributions and, subsequently, inequality and poverty indices for one year at the onset of the crisis (2008), for a more recent year based on the availability of the microsimulation models (2010) and for counterfactual scenarios as described hereafter.
Microsimulation and Data
Simulations are performed using the tax-bene…t calculator EUROMOD for France, Germany and the UK and SWITCH for Ireland. Both of these microsimulation models numerically simulate tax-bene…t rules, allowing the computation of all social contributions, direct taxes and transfers to yield household disposable income. 14 The FRS is a well-known source for statistical studies in the UK, notably used in national microsimulation (see Sutherland, 2013) . EU-SILC (statistics on income and life conditions) constitute the most recent and important source of microdata for comparative studies on income distribution in Europe. Started in 2003 for 6 member states (Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Luxemburg and Austria), as French EU-SILC data is the previous year so that the 2008 data collects 2007 income and the 2010 data collects 2009 income. We account for this delay by uprating all income sources by speci…c factors in EUROMOD in order to be able to use the 2008 and 2010 policy parameters with the corresponding data for each year. In the Appendix, we compare simulated disposable income distributions with actual distributions (i.e. those from external statistics or directly observed in the data) and discuss the potential discrepancies caused by delayed incomes for these two countries. Finally, notice that EU-SILC data used in SWITCH for Ireland and FRS data used in EUROMOD for the UK make use of current income, i.e. household income in its labor market status at the date of data collection, rather than annual income. Annual income is used for the two others countries but also in external statistics. In the Appendix, we extensively discuss how this other source of di¤erences between observed and simulated distributions may be related to such di¤erences in terms of income de…nition. Table 1 shows mean household gross income, taxes, transfers, social security contributions (SSC) and disposable income for the four countries investigated. These statistics give some preliminary insight into potential tax-bene…t policy e¤ects on household disposable income. Gross income decreases in all countries between 2008 and 2010, except for the UK which saw modest income rises. In France and Germany, however, disposable income increases while in Ireland, it decreases less rapidly than gross income. In the UK, there is a more rapid increase of disposable than of gross income. The main reason for these phenomena is the stabilizing e¤ect of tax-bene…t systems over the 2008-2010 period, i.e. a decrease in market income for some households is partly compensated by an automatic decrease (increase) in taxes paid (bene…ts received). On top of this stabilization provided by the initial policy set, there may be also the speci…c e¤ect of policy changes over the period, the role of which is investigated in the rest of this paper. We can already comment on this using trends in tax and bene…t aggregates in Table 1 . Yet we must keep in mind that these trends combine the stabilization e¤ect (how taxes paid and bene…ts received vary due to changes in market incomes) and the e¤ect of policy reforms during the period. Tax changes in Germany and France seem regressive. In particular, in Germany, the tax bill falls substantially between the two periods ( 11%), likely due to the change in taxation of capital income previously described. Conversely, tax payments increase well as Norway, EU-SILC has been extended to other EU countries in 2004-2005, followed by Bulgaria, Rumania, Turkey and Swizerland from 2007. It gathers annual cross-sectional information on European individuals and households (incomes, socio-demographics, social exclusion, life condition). It was originally created to provide the material for structural indices of social cohesion in Europe (Laeken indices).
Aggregate Changes in Incomes, Taxes and Bene…ts
in Ireland, following the exceptional measures described above and, in particular, the introduction of a Tax Levy on all gross incomes. Social security contributions increase a lot but mean changes hide the progressive structure of the Health Levy. The tax increase in the UK is small and in line with the gross income increase. In France (and the UK), the transfer system contributes most to the increase in disposable income with households receiving an average of 9% (11%) more in transfers in 2010 compared to 2008, probably in ‡uenced by the uprating of social transfers and tax credits and the introduction of an in-work transfer, the RSA, in France as described above. A similar and even stronger redistributive e¤ect can be observed for Ireland, with a 24% increase in transfers between 2008 and 2010 more than compensating for the sharp rise in employee contributions and cushioning much of the dramatic decrease in mean gross income. Policy changes on the bene…t side are more modest in Germany, with transfer payments increasing by only 1% over the period. Again, these trends combine the interaction of existing policies with changes in market income, together with genuine tax-bene…t policy reforms over the period. The decomposition approach suggested hereafter allows us to disentangle these two factors. 
De…nitions and the Decomposition Method
First, it is important to de…ne our terminology and the scope of the policy changes that we intend to characterize in what follows. Our analysis focuses on changes in the distribution of household disposable income (after equivalization to account for household size and composition, using the modi…ed OECD equivalent scale). 'Disposable income', as widely used to measure poverty and inequality, is de…ned as all household incomes net of taxes and social contributions and after receipt of all types of bene…ts. By household 'gross income'or 'market income', we mean the total amount of labor income (including replacement incomes, i.e., public pensions and unemployment bene…ts, in France and Germany), capital income and private pensions before taxes and bene…ts. The only di¤erence of treatment between countries concerns the nature of replacement incomes (public pensions and unemployment bene…ts). They are considered as transfers in the UK and Ireland because public pensions and unemployment insurance can be viewed as part of the redistributive system (maximum bene…t levels are not tied to the amount of past contributions). For France and Germany, pensions and unemployment bene…ts are insurance mechanisms, with payments closely related to contributions levels (even if the latter are capped above a certain income level), so that we treat them as replacement income among other sources of gross income.
Our decomposition analysis will isolate a "policy e¤ect" from "other e¤ects", as sketched above. The "policy e¤ect" denotes the contribution of changes in tax-bene…t policies related to direct taxation (including tax allowances and tax credits), social security contributions, non-contributory bene…ts (child and family bene…ts as well as social assistance) and, for the UK and Ireland, the contributory bene…ts treated as redistribution (essentially Jobseeker's allowances and public pensions). 15 "Other e¤ects" correspond to all other factors in ‡uencing the disposable income distribution, i.e. changes in gross incomes due to market forces but also non-simulated policies (changes in minimum wage, changes in unemployment bene…t in France and Germany etc.). 16 We de…ne four main simulated distributions of disposable income in our analysis. The …rst two are simply the base and end period disposable income distributions, which we denote (0) and (4) respectively, obtained by applying the tax-bene…t rules of base and end period to the corresponding household gross incomes. These income distributions are simulated so Gini indices or poverty rates calculated on the basis of these distributions may not coincide precisely with o¢ cial data or with Gini and poverty rates calculated from observed disposable incomes at base and end periods. In Appendix 3, we explain in detail how and why simulated inequality and poverty measures di¤er in levels from observed ones at any point in time. We show nonetheless that they are relatively close in terms of time variation, which is the key aspect for the validity of our analysis (see Figure  A .1 in the Appendix). The value added of our approach comes precisely from the ability to simulate actual as well as possible income distributions and, essentially, counterfactual distributions. We 15 Simulated policies, de…ning the scope of our policy e¤ect, are listed in Table A .1 in the Appendix while the actual changes in these policies over the period were described in section 2 and summarized in Table A .2 in the Appendix. 16 For Ireland, changes to public sector wages are also counted in our 'policy e¤ect', as discussed above.
Failure to model the pension related deduction a¤ecting public sector pay would mean that the e¤ect of this would not be picked up in the 'other e¤ect'as it a¤ected net and not gross pay.
de…ne scenario (2) as the end year distribution under the assumption that tax-bene…t policies have not changed between the two years. Symmetrically, we characterize scenario (3) as the end year distribution assuming no change in all other factors, including the distribution of market incomes (i.e. assuming that the only change over the period is due to tax-bene…t policy reforms). We introduce some notation to describe the construction of these counterfactuals. Denote y a matrix describing the population contained in the data, i.e., each row contains all the information about a given household, including various gross/market income sources and socio-demographic characteristics. Denote d the 'tax-bene…t function'transforming, for each household, gross incomes and household characteristics into a certain level of disposable income. Tax-bene…t calculations also depend on a set of monetary parameters p (e.g., maximum bene…t amounts, threshold level of tax brackets, etc.). Thus, the distribution of disposable income is represented hereafter by d i (p j ; y l ), for a hypothetical scenario including the population of year l, the tax-bene…t parameters of year j and the tax-bene…t structure of year i. We are interested in relative inequality/poverty indices I, computed as a function I d i (p j ; y l ) of the (simulated) distribution of disposable income. Denoting base and end years by 0 and 1 respectively, we …rst simulate the base and end year situations (0) and (4) as described above, corresponding to d 0 (p 0 ; y 0 ) and d 1 (p 1 ; y 1 ) respectively.
To construct our key counterfactual scenarios (2) and (3), we must consider the possibility of nominally adjusting income levels by the uprating factor 1 , i.e., the income growth rate between year 0 and year 1. That is, 1 y 0 retains the structural characteristics of year 0 data (in particular, the distribution of gross income) but adopts the nominal levels prevailing in year 1. Policy changes can combine changes in policy structure d and changes in parameters p (the 'policy uprating'). We de…ne counterfactuals where tax-bene…t monetary parameters can be uprated using the same factor 1 that is used to scale up the distribution of gross income between period 0 and 1. Clearly, the nominally adjusted system, denoted 1 p 0 , is not identical to the actual set of parameters p 1 as decided by the authorities. 17 Thus, scenario (2) is written d 0 ( 1 p 0 ; y 1 ), i.e. it is the noreform counterfactual where the only policy change between years 0 and 1 is an uprating of money parameters in line with income growth, as explained above. It can be used in a …rst decomposition:
where the policy e¤ect is evaluated while holding the population constant at end year. Scenario (3) is written d 1 (p 1 ; 1 y 0 ) and corresponds to the counterfactual where the market income distribution is hold constant (market incomes and policy parameters are just uprated using the same 1 factor). It is used in a second decomposition:
where the policy e¤ect is evaluated while holding the population constant at the base year.
In both decompositions, the last term is identical. It depends on another counterfactual scenario d 0 ( 1 p 0 ; 1 y 0 ), denoted situation (1) hereafter. Notice that tax-bene…t functions d(p; y) are usually linearly homogeneous in p and y, i.e. a simultaneous change in nominal levels (e.g. switching from French Franc to Euro) of both gross incomes and monetary tax-bene…t parameters should not a¤ect the relative position of households in the distribution of disposable income. The direct consequence of this is that scenario (0), i.e. d 0 (p 0 ; y 0 ), should be equal to scenario (1) . That is, the 'income growth' component, the third term in both decompositions, should be zero. While this should be the case in France, Ireland and the UK, part of the German system may not ful…ll this condition. Germany is characterized by a concave income tax function, in contrast to the piecewise linear income tax schedule of other countries and, therefore, a non-homogenous tax-bene…t function. We shall check this empirically in the next section. Finally, since there is no compelling reason for preferring the …rst decomposition over the second, we also compute the Shorrocks-Shapley decomposition by averaging the contributions for the two decompositions above, which gives the average policy e¤ect, P , and the average other e¤ect, O:
Results
The main results are shown in Figures 3 to 5 and we discuss each country separately below. In each graph, we summarize the main trends, with bars representing base year indices normalized to 100, end year indices and index levels under the counterfactual "policy e¤ect" (if only policies had changed, i.e. market income uprated in a distributionally neutral way) and the counterfactual "other e¤ects" (if policies were unchanged, i.e. only uprated in a distributionally neutral way). Tables A.4 to A.6 in Appendix A present the complete decomposition results for Germany, France, Ireland and the UK respectively. In these tables, we report poverty and inequality statistics relating to the base period 0 (corresponding to year 2008) in column (0) of each table and the end period 1 (corresponding to year 2010) in column (4) . Three counterfactuals are also presented, as discussed above.
Column (1) shows the base period indices where both the data and the policies are uprated to the end period. The di¤erence between column (0) and column (1) is a check of the linear homogeneity property discussed above. We observe that for all inequality and poverty indices, this component is zero so that homogeneity holds and the third component of both decompositions can be ignored. 18 Thus we can concentrate on the main components of the decomposition method. Column (2) shows the poverty/inequality indices for end year data with (uprated) base year policies while column (3) shows indices for (uprated) base year data with end year policies. The di¤erence between columns (4) and (0) depicts the total change in each index between 2008 and 2010. This is decomposed into the (negligible) income growth e¤ect, the tax-bene…t policy e¤ect and the "other" e¤ect which encompasses market income changes and all other potential in ‡uences. We report three decompositions, the end-period weighted decomposition I, the base-period weighted decomposition II and the Shorrocks-Shapley decomposition, i.e the average of these two. We observe that all three decompositions lead to similar conclusions, which reassures us that results are not sensitive to the decomposition path chosen. Therefore, and for conciseness, we shall base our comments on the Shapley decomposition results.
The battery of indices we study includes the Gini, the Atkinson index and percentile ratios for inequality. For the risk of poverty (which we simply denote poverty hereafter for the sake of brevity), we report the headcount ratio (FGT0), the intensity of poverty (FGT1) and the depth of poverty when applying the principle of transfers among the poor (FGT2). (Risk of) poverty is relative, i.e. measured as the proportion of households below a poverty line set at 60% or 50% of the median of equivalized income. We report overall poverty and poverty for sub-population. Child poverty is measured as the poverty rate of households with children under 18, according to the Eurostat de…nition and elderly poverty is de…ned as poverty of households headed by adults over 60 years of age. We also calculate changes in a more absolute measure of poverty by simply anchoring the poverty lines to their initial (base year) levels. 19 18 We have calculated bootstrapped standard errors and …nd that this di¤erence is not statistically di¤erent from zero for all countries (even for Germany where non-homogeneity could be expected due to income taxation, as previously explained). 19 The anchored poverty measure consists of …xing the the poverty line at 60% of the median income of the base year distribution and adjusting it nominally for the end year and the di¤erent counterfactuals. Adjustments are made using 1 to preserve the homogeneity of the absolute poverty measure, which
France
We …rst see that inequality has increased between 2008 and 2010 in France, with the Gini index rising by 7:1% (from 26:5 to 28:4) and the Atkinson index increasing by 15:9% (from 6:1 to 7) . These increases are almost entirely due to changes in market income. A small policy e¤ect working in the opposite direction is obtained with decomposition II but not with decomposition I. For the poorest, relative positions deteriorate since the relative poverty headcount has increased by 13:4%, from 10:3% to 11:7%. This is the result of a strong shock to their market income ("other e¤ects") with just a very small compensation by policy e¤ects. The most spectacular result is the rise in the intensity of poverty, captured by the FGT1. It follows the same pattern as headcount poverty, i.e. the increase of 24:1% is almost entirely due to market income e¤ects, re ‡ecting how increasing unemployment has a¤ected the lower part of the income distribution. Turning to "absolute" poverty changes, i.e. when …xing the poverty line at a constant level in real (income in ‡ation adjusted) terms, we con…rm that the standard of living of the poor has increased thanks mainly to the policy e¤ect. We can conjecture that the positive policy e¤ect is largely due to the RSA reform and its in-work component that provided an income top-up to the working poor. Absolute poverty has decreased by 9:9% while it would have decreased by just 3% without actual policy changes. Child poverty is observed to increase by 4:8% over the time period studied. This increase is driven by market income changes although policy e¤ects do compensate for these to some extent. The increase in child poverty would have been 10:5% in the absence of policy changes (notably, the introduction of the RSA). Absolute child poverty is reduced by 19:4% since, in this case, both policy and other e¤ects cumulate so that the living conditions of family with children improve. Relative elderly poverty is stable over the period.
Germany
In terms of inequality, there have been some small changes between 2008 and 2010 in Germany. The Gini index decreased by 1:7%, from 27:5 to 27:1, over this period (the Atkinson index also decreased from 6:7 to 6:6). This is entirely due to the market income e¤ect. The percentile ratios in Table A.4 show, however, a slight increase in inequality at the bottom of the distribution driven by policy changes, i.e. the ratio of the 50th
would not be the case if we used CPI (EUROSTAT de…nition). In the latter case, the di¤erence between (1) and (0) would simply re ‡ects the people who switch from poor to nonpoor due to a poverty line adjusted by in ‡ation rather than gross income growth (and not a check of the homogeneity property). In this case, nonetheless, results are similar at least in two ways: the sign of the total change (4)-(1) is unchanged and the relative contributions of the policy e¤ect versus other e¤ects are also very similar to our base results (complete tables using CPI instead of 1 are available from the authors). percentile of income to the 10th percentile. A decline in the relative position of those at the bottom of the distribution is con…rmed by the poverty measures. Headcount ratio poverty, with a relative poverty line set at 60% of the median, increased by 6:6% between 2008 and 2010, from 16:1% to 17:2% of the German population. This is mainly due to policy changes, with a very small increase also attributable to market income. Like in France, one of the most pronounced changes is the increase in poverty depth (FGT1 and FGT2) over the period, attributable to market income changes for half and to tax-bene…t reforms for the other half. These trends re ‡ect changes in the relative position of the lowest income groups but not changes in their absolute standard of living. When …xing the poverty line in real terms, we observe a decrease in the headcount ratio due to the policy e¤ect. Turning to child poverty, we also observe a decrease in their relative position while, this time, all of it is explained by market income changes. There is a compensating e¤ect of policy, indicating that the increase in child poverty would be twice as high in the absence of the policy e¤ect which is likely to be attributable to increases in child bene…ts and education allowances. When anchoring the poverty line, we see that these policies in favor of families with children had a large compensatory e¤ect and managed to increase the absolute standard of living of these families, despite the negative shock to market income. By contrast, the increase of 4:3% in the headcount ratio for those aged over 60 is entirely due to tax-bene…t policy changes. These are likely to include the change in capital income taxation which should disproportionately a¤ect the retired. 20 
Ireland
Changes in market income have led to an increase in both inequality and poverty in Ireland. Yet the impact on poverty is relatively modest compared to France and, especially, compared to what could have been expected in a context of massive job losses. This is explained in part by the fact that earnings in the worst hit sector (housing and construction) were relatively high before the crisis. Interestingly, results for the policy e¤ects are particularly clear cut with respect to the intuitions sketched in the policy descriptions of section 2.2. Indeed, policy changes have partly tempered the market e¤ect in the case of inequality and more than compensated for it in the case of relative poverty. More precisely, the Gini index has slightly increased between 2008 and 2010, from 29:1 to 29:2 (+0:5%) as has the Atkinson index (+2:7%). These indices would have risen by 10:2% and 20:3% respectively, had actual tax-bene…t policy reforms not taken place, i.e. policy changes have neutralized around 95% of the inequality increase due to the e¤ect of the crisis on the income distribution (see also O'Donoghue et al., 2013). In line with the small change in the Gini, there was little change in the percentile ratios. Regarding poverty, our simulation results show a small, consistent decrease in all poverty measures. The key point from the simulation results is that the decline in relative poverty is the result of a strong policy e¤ect counteracting market forces. In particular, the headcount ratio decreased by 12:2% while it would have increased by 11:3% in the absence of actual policy changes. The strongest upward pressure on poverty from changes in market incomes a¤ects the over sixties (42:1% increase in the absence of policy). 21 The total e¤ect, 18:1%, nonetheless re ‡ects the impact of policy choices bene…ting the elderly. 22 The poverty reducing e¤ect for families with children is likely to be due to broadly stable welfare payments and the increased targeting of family transfers, as described above, i.e. the compensation of cuts to the universal Child Bene…t by increased payments to welfare recipients. 
UK
The Gini measure fell from 32:8 to 31:5 in the UK during the period under analysis ( 4:2%) and the Atkinson index also registered a decrease ( 17:8%). The decline in 21 Between 2008 and 2010, a slightly higher proportion of the over sixties de…ne themselves as being retired or unemployed, while a lower proportion report themsleves as being employed or self employed, thus impacting upon the proportion of the over sixties in receipt of employee or self employed income. 22 Bene…t recipients over 65 were the only group to receive an increase in social welfare payment rates in 2009 and not see them decline in later budgets. Moreover, the Income Levy introduced in 2009 also had a higher exemption limit for the over 65's.
inequality seems to occur mainly in the …rst half of the distribution, with a decrease of the p50/p10 percentile ratio. These changes are driven mainly by tax-bene…t policy reforms of the period. Results are in the same line regarding poverty. Relative poverty has slightly decreased (the headcount ratio decreases by 1:9%), driven by tax-bene…t policy changes such as the uprating policies for bene…ts and the working tax credit or the lower standard tax rate. These reforms have more than compensated for the tendency of market income changes to increase poverty. This is also re ‡ected in the pronounced drop in absolute poverty ( 10:9%). Admittedly, the intensity of relative poverty has slightly increased, driven by market forces, but the depth of absolute poverty has been reduced thanks to tax-bene…t policy changes. Child poverty rates saw a sharp decline from 20% to 18:6% in 2010 due to policies, most likely due to increases in child bene…t rates (+8% between 2008 and 2010) and increases in child tax credits, as documented previously. Once again, market income changes actually pushed child poverty rates in the opposite direction but the net overall change was negative. Elderly poverty rates also saw a fall of 1:6 percentage points, mainly due to changes in market income although tax-bene…t policy also had a role to play. 
Concluding Discussion
This paper examined the impact on inequality and poverty of the …rst three years of the Great Recession in France, Germany, Ireland and the UK. Using microsimulated counterfactuals, we decompose changes in inequality and poverty measures into the contribution of tax-bene…t policy changes and all other factors, notably those impacting on gross income distributions because of the crisis (job losses, work sharing, wage cuts, etc.) or because of other, non-simulated policies (e.g. minimum wage changes etc.). To put results in perspective, Figure 7 compares policy and other e¤ects for all countries, unveiling very contrasted trends. Maybe counter to intuition, the country most a¤ected by the economic turmoil, Ireland, implemented a strong and very progressive set of policy responses over this period. To a large extent, this policy response served to o¤set the rise in inequality and relative poverty which would have arisen from changes in unemployment and market income. While policy e¤ects are comparable in France and the UK, they did not prevent a rise in the relative poverty count and intensity due to market forces in France, while they managed to stabilize or even reduce them in the UK. Another unexpected result is the relatively regressive policy response in Germany. While the period under investigation is too short to draw conclusions regarding a change in the German social model, the years 2008-2010 have, nonetheless, witnessed a combination of regressive tax policy and slow uprating of social bene…ts for the poorest and these are responsible for increased poverty in this country. Overall, a general conclusion from our analysis is that tax-bene…t policy e¤ects have had a very important role, sometimes larger than the shock on market incomes due to the crisis. For instance, policy e¤ects explain almost all of the relative poverty increase in Germany and of the decline in relative poverty in Ireland and the UK. As stressed in the introduction, our analysis unfortunately stops in 2010 due to the unavailability of combined microsimulation and data for more recent years in such a comparative framework as the one we use. It is, nonetheless, important to characterize the policy responses that have followed the onset of the economic slump while our study has performed this for the …rst dip in the recent recession. In 2010, Jobseekers Allowance reduced for those aged 18-21
A Appendix

A.1 Description of Tax-Bene…t Policies
Child benefits, tax credits & social transfer child increments
Reforms of universal child benefit, education benefit and child allowances in 2009
Over the period, decrease in child benefit (see below) compensated for poor families by an increase of 24% in social benefit child increments £ the Child Tax Credit in the UK has been frozen nominally * Factor α is the distributionally-neutral uprating factor used in the "no reform" scenarios; it is calculated as the % change in mean income over the period and necessarily smaller than wage progression in time of job losses and work sharing. † Social security contribution (SSC) and Income tax thresholds averaged over all thresholds. In Ireland, no change to the SSC ceiling but an increase of 48% in the maximum amount payable. ‡ In-work benefit or tax credit on labor income. In Ireland, Family Income Supplement received is 60% of the gap between family income and an income limit. This income limit increased by 3.3%, hence a 2% increase i.e. 60%*3.3% Other effects 
A.2 Detailed Decomposition Results
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A.3 Comparison of Simulated versus Observed Disposable Income
As explained in the text, our decomposition exercise is based on simulated rather than observed data on disposable income. Simulations are precisely the added value of this exercise since they allow us to produce counterfactual distributions to be used in the decomposition to isolate tax-bene…t policy e¤ects from other e¤ects. The drawback, however, is that simulated income distributions for actual situations (those of years 2008 and 2010) do not always perfectly match external information. We explain why in what follows. Nonetheless, the important aspect is that while inequality and poverty measures may di¤er in levels at any point in time, time variations point in the same direction for both simulated and external data, as can be seen in Figure A. 1. In this graph, we compare our simulated trends with o¢ cial statistics (Eurostat for France and Germany, Households Below Average Income (HBAI) data for the UK and statistics from the CSO for Ireland). The values used to produce these trends are detailed in Table A .7. As mentioned above, we observe important discrepancies in levels in this table, which can be explained by at least three groups of factors. First, these di¤erences may just reveal the imperfect comparison between simulated and external data to the extent that the de…nition of disposable income, or the way it is calculated, di¤ers in the two sources -we give more detailed explanations country by country below. Second, discrepancies can be attributed to data issues concerning disposable income for some countries where interviews are used and, possibly, contaminated with measurement errors and recall errors (when people are asked how much taxes were paid or bene…t received in a particular year). This is not a systematic source of errors: for France, for instance, income information in EU-SILC data is drawn from the Administrative Tax Revenue Data and is, therefore, very accurate. Third, and more likely, di¤erences can be attributed to simpli…cation assumptions made in microsimulation, including (i) the assumption of full take-up of bene…ts or tax credits (although we do introduce basic take-up modeling for certain bene…ts, as discussed hereafter), (ii) the assumption of tax compliance (we do not assume any rate of non-compliance, fraud, error or tax evasion); (iii) the amount of tax modeled by higher earners is often larger than the amount of tax actually paid (as they may avail of certain smaller tax relief schemes that are not possible to model in a microsimulation framework); (iv) timing issues such as the fact that reforms take place during the year (in addition, income data for France and Germany are provided with a delay, as discussed in section 3.1 and below). We now provide more detailed explanations country by country (see also Doorley, 2013 France. EUROMOD-simulated inequality and poverty rates are underestimated in France, as can be seen in Table A .7. To understand the discrepancies, it is important to bear in mind that no data adjustments are made in EUROMOD in situations where the policy year does not correspond to the data year -except a nominal adjustment of the di¤erent types of income since they are recorded for year t 1 in data of year t, as explained in section 3.1. In particular, no adjustment is made for changes in market income distribution that have taken place between t 1 and t. For instance, it is possible that losses in employment may be driving the higher inequality observed in external statistics, but not showing up in EUROMOD. Non-take-up of some means-tested bene…ts or administrative errors in the implementation of these bene…ts may play a role in poverty discrepancies.
Only the non take-up of general social assistance (RMI/ RSA) is simulated in EURO-MOD and done by simple random draws of non-claiming households. If marginalized, peripheral groups are less likely to claim bene…ts to which they are theoretically entitled, incomes at the bottom will be in ‡ated in EUROMOD and poverty will be underestimated. Child poverty is also greatly understated in EUROMOD, for the same reason but also for additional factors. For instance, it is possible that non-take up of some means-tested family bene…ts also accounts for this pattern. Data limitations must also play a role in the observed discrepancies. For instance, accurate simulation of the parental leave bene…t was not possible given the information available in SILC, resulting in a substantial overestimation of this bene…t compared to external statistics (see Doorley, 2013) . Importantly, these limitations are systematic across years so that they should a¤ect trends less than levels. Indeed, Figure A .1 con…rms that inequality trends according to our simulation are comparable to external benchmarks. We …nd a larger increase in poverty risk calculated using the poverty line at 60% of the median (+1:4 percentage points versus +0:2 in external statistics). With a poverty line at 50% of the median (not reported), results are more comparable (+1:5 points versus +0:8 in external statistics).
Germany. Table A .7 shows that inequality is underestimated in EUROMOD simulations for Germany while poverty is slightly overestimated. Child poverty is largely comparable to external benchmarks. As in the case of France, policy simulations for a year t in Germany rely on income information from year t 1. As a result, changes in work duration or wage inequalities between 2007 and 2008 or 2009 and 2010 may explain the higher inequality observed in the external benchmarks for our base and end years. Moreover, to render the 2008 and 2010 German data comparable, it was necessary to discard the imputation of tax allowances which was introduced only in 2010. This results in an over-estimation of tax liabilities (of around 10% on average). 23 As with the French social assistance scheme, we also model take-up of social assistance in Germany. Unemployment assistance, old-age assistance and general social assistance are assumed to have take-up rates of 59%, following the available literature on bene…t take-up in Germany (Bruckmeier and Wiemers, 2011) . It should also be noted that housing bene…ts have not been simulated in EUROMOD, but simply imputed from the data, because reported information on housing expenditures is not detailed enough. These factors are likely to contribute to the overestimation of poverty observed in our results. These limitations are consistent across years and Figure A.1 shows that simulated and actual trends in total poverty and inequality go in the same direction.
Ireland. External statistics are provided by the Central Statistics O¢ ce (CSO) in Ireland but we also refer to information from Eurostat for comparability purposes. As in Germany, simulations for Ireland underestimate inequality and overestimate poverty according to Table A.7. Simulations acknowledge the low take-up levels of the Irish transfer to working poor households (the Family Income Supplement, FIS), imputing a random take-up rate of 33%. As in the French case, however, random imputation may be a crude approximation. In addition, one driving factor for the di¤erence with external sources is the fact that SWITCH is based on current income, while CSO results are based on annual income. Lump sums, such as retirement and redundancy payments which are likely to have increased in importance during the recession, 24 will appear in annual income but not current income. The issue of current compared to annual income will also in ‡uence where individuals are found in the income distribution given changes in their employment status over time, especially during a period of rising unemployment. In terms of trends ( Figure A.1) , external statistics show a larger rise in the Gini (+0:9 percentage points compared to +0:1 in the simulation). Our simulations show a fall in the overall poverty rate ( 12:2%) which is con…rmed by Eurostat statistics, even if it is substantially smaller ( 1:9%). 25 Poverty using 50% of the median also compares better (not reported) with Eurostat indicating a decrease of 12% (starting from a "at risk of poverty" rate of 7:7%) while our simulations give a 25% decline (starting from 8:1%).
UK. External …gures for the UK (HBAI) are provided by the Department of Work and Pension and based on the same underlying data source as for EUROMOD, the FRS. While 24 Redundancy payments will have increased in importance as unemployment grew. In addition to this, the 'Incentivised Early Retirement Scheme' will have resulted in larger numbers receiving retirement lump sum retirement payments. 25 CSO external statistics show a slight rise (+0:3). Note however that our simulation and Eurostat use the modi…ed OECD equivalence scale (which gives a weight of 1 to the …rst adult in a household, .5 to subsequent adults and .3 to children) while the CSO uses a national equivalence scale (giving a weight of .66 to subsequent adults and .33 to children), which reduces still the comparison possibilities.
the simulated poverty rate is close to the external statistics, the Gini coe¢ cient for the base year is underestimated. 26 In addition to the standard di¤erences mentioned above regarding simulated versus actual data, Sutherland (2013) suggests a possible reason for the discrepancy in the Gini. The external statistics (HBAI) correct for an insu¢ cient number of high income households in the FRS data sample using administrative information from tax statistics. As Sutherland (2013) point out, this will result in an increase in income at the upper end of the income distribution and a¤ect the Gini measure. It is indicated that results from EUROMOD and external statistics become closer once this issue is taken into account. Note also that non-take-up is modeled for the Working Tax Credit, with the same limitation as emphasized above. Despite these potential caveats, simulated trends in inequality and poverty are relatively similar to those based on external statistics for the UK. External statistics for the Gini show a sharper fall (3 percentage points) compared to EUROMOD simulations (1:4 points). The pattern in overall and child poverty rates point in the same direction and are more similar, with the EUROMOD results being slightly lower than the external statistics. 
